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APPELLANT'S ABSTRACT 
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In the 
SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
In the Matter of the Estate of 
ANNA L. HAR-RIS, Deceased. 
ZION'S SAVINGS BANK AND 
TRUST COMPANY, a cor-
poration, 
Ap·pellant 
vs. 
STERLING P. HARRIS, admin-
istrator of the estate of Anna 
L. Harris, deceased, 
Respondent. 
APPELLANT'S ABSTRACT 
30 ORDER 
Case No. 
6238 
On Stip.ulation in open Court by J. D. Skeen, 
attorney for Sterling P. Harris, administrator 
herein and H. P. Thomas, attorney for Zion's 
Savings Bank & Trust Company and good cause 
. 
appearing, 
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IT IS HEREBY ORD·ERED, that no appli-
cation shall be made nor any order entered author-
izing said administrator to revive or institute any 
proceedings in bankruptcy or debtors relief with-
out notice of the application for such order first 
being served on said .Zion's Savings Bank & Trust 
Company or its attorneys. 
Dated and filed March 24, 1939. 
(Signed) Allen G. Thurman, Judge 
PETITION 
Comes now Sterling P. Harris, administra-
tor of the above entitled estate, and respectfully 
shows to the court : 
That at the time of the death of Anna L. 
Harris, there was pending in the United States 
District Court for the District of Utah, a pro-
ceeding under Section 75 of the Bankruptcy Act; 
that said proceeding was abated by the death of 
said Anna L. Harris. 
Your petitioner further sho,vs to the court 
that unless said proceeding is revived and rein-
stated, the entire estate of the said deceased is in 
danger of being lost. 
WHEREFORE, said petitioner prays for an 
order of this court authorizing him to apply to the 
United States District Court for an order reviv-
ing· and reinstating the said debtor relief pro-
ceeding . 
. J. D. Skeen, E. J. Skeen, 
AttornPys fo1" Prfitioner 
Sterling P. Harris, 
PetitionPr 
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Not dated. Verified February 9, 1940. Filed 
February 10, 1940. 
34 ORDER .A.UTHORIZING ADMINISTRATOR 
TO APPLY TO UNITED STATES COURT 
This cause came on for hearing upon the lOth 
day of February, 1940, on the petition of Sterling 
P. Harris, administrator of the estate of Anna L. 
Harris, deceased, praying- for the relief herein-
after provided; notice of said petition and hear-
ing haYing been previously served upon Zion's 
Savings Bank and Trust Company, a corporation; 
the administrator being represented by his attor-
ney, E. J. Skeen and said bank by its attorneys, 
Thomas and Thomas; and the court having heard 
said petition and the arguments of counsel and it 
appearing and the court finds that there was 
pending in the United States District Court, Dis-
trict of Utah in February, 1g.3s, a proceedings by 
and on behalf of said Anna L. Harris as debtor 
under and pursuant to Section 75, Bankruptcy 
Laws of the United States for relief of debtors, 
which upon the death of said deceased 'vas there-
upon abated by said U:nited States Court in Jan-
uary, 1939; that on March 22, 1939, said adminis-
trator was appointed herein and thereafter said 
bank commenced suit in this court against said 
administrator to foreclose a mortgage upon farm 
lands in Salt Lake County, Utah of said deceased, 
joining others the'rein as defendants \\7ho claimed 
liens thereon nnd obtained a judgment of fore-
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closure July 17, 1939, and a certificate of sale to 
said lands at sheriff's sale August 15, 1939, for 
$5,417.46, and the period of redemption from said 
sale will expire by the laws of the State of Utah 
on February 15, 1940, and no redemption has been 
made and said proceedings in said United States 
Court have not been revived, 
NOW THEREFORE, it is hereby ordered 
that said petition be granted and said administra-
tor authorized to apply to said United Stat~s Dis-
trict Court for an order reviving and re-instating 
the said debtor relief proceedings, or instituting 
new proceedings in said court as advised. 
And it is further ordered that said bank may 
on appeal herefrom to the Supreme Court of the 
State of Utah, stay the execution and enforcement 
of this order by giving bond as provided by law 
for such stay in the sum of $500.00 to the effect 
that it will pay, in the event this order is sustained 
on appeal, all damages which said administrator 
may sustain by reason of the order having been 
stayed pending appeal and the adn1inistrator not 
having been allowed to make said application to 
said United States Court. 
Dated and filed February 13, 1940. 
P. C. Evans, Judge 
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR 
Comes now the appellant and says there is 
manifest error in the records, proceedings and 
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order, given, made and entered the 13th day of 
February, 1940, by the trial court herein, said 
order being entitled ''Order Authorizing Admin-
, 
istrator to Apply to United States Court" (Tr. 
34), and appellant hereby assigns the following 
errors upon which it relies for a reversal of said 
order, to-wit: 
1. The trial court erred in granting the Pe-
tition of respondent praying for the order afore-
said, which Petition is signed and verified by 
appellant the 9th day of February, 1940. (Tr. 31). 
2. The trial court erred in making and en-
tering the order herein appealed from, to-wit, 
''Order Authorizing Administrator to Apply to 
United States Court" (Tr. 34). 
Respectfully submitted, 
THOMAS & THOMAS, 
Attorneys for Appellan.t 
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Appeal fro1n Third Judicial District Court, 
Salt Lake County, Utah 
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In the 
SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
In the Matter of the Estate of 
ANNA L. HARRIS, Deceased. 
ZION'S SAVINGS BANK AND 
TRUST COMPANY, a cor-
poration, 
Appellant 
vs. 
STERLING P. HARRIS, admin-
istrator of the estate of Anna 
L. Harris, deceased, 
Respondent. 
r 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
1. STATEMENT 
Case No. 
6238 
Appellant Zion's Savings Bank and Trust Company, 
the mortgagee and holder of a sheriff's certificate of 
sale on foreclosure, appeals from an order of the pro-
bate court granting the petition of respondent, Sterling 
P. Harris, administrator, authorizing the administrator 
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2 
to make application to the United States District Court 
of U~tah to ·revive a Debtor Relief proceedings (or insti-
tute new ones) under the Frazier- Lemke Act commenced 
by his wife, Anna L. Harris, the mortgagor, but which 
were abated by order of the federal court upon her death. 
The Frazier-L~emke Act relates only to farmer deb-
tors. It is Section 75 of the federal bankruptcy law as 
amended in 19'35. 11 U. S. C. A. Sec. 203. It was en-
acted in 1933 and is divided into two parts-subsections 
"a" to "r" relating to compositions and extensions for 
farmer debtors, and subsection ''s'' a 3-year moratorium 
for the farmer, re-enacted in 1935 in somewhat less 
rigorous terms than its predecessor which had been ruled 
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. The entire Act, 
Section 75, was carried forward into the general revi-
sion of the B'ankruptcy Law in 19'38 by what is common-
ly known as the Chandler Act. 
Under the Frazier-L.emke Act a farmer insolvent in 
the equity sense, files a petition in federal court under 
said Section 75 seeking a composition or extension of 
his debts anytime before the period of redemption on 
foreclosure or execution expires-in fact, even after-
ward if sheriff's deed has not yet actually been issued, 
a.nd the period of redemption is thereby, without more, 
ipso facto extended indefinitely and all actions against 
the farmer are stayed. Johnson's Commentary, Chand-
ler Act, 11 U. S. C. A. (Sec. 201 to end) p. xxv. 
The matter is referred to a conciliation commissioner 
(conciliator) who calls a creditor's meeting. The farmer 
proposes terms of c?mposition and extension. Accept-
ance in writing of the proposal by creditors of a ma-
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jority in number and amount, and confirmation by the 
judge as an equitable and feasible method of liquidating 
secured claims and calculated to serve the interests of 
creditor and farmer alike, must be obtained or the pro-
ceedings fail of fruition. This is the first part of the 
Act, subsections ''a'' to '' r '', and failing the approval 
of both creditor and judge, the proceedings must be 
dismissed-but, not if the farmer elects (and he always 
does) to proceed under the last part of the Act, sub-
section '' s. '' 
Subsection '' s'' takes up where subsections ''a'' to 
'' r'' leave off. Under '' s '' the debtor, being unsuccess-
ful with his proposal of composition and extension and 
consequently confronted with a dismissal of his pro-
ceedings, ''amends'' his petition, asks to be adjudicated 
a bankrupt and for retention of the property during a 
3-year moratorium. The court orders the 3-year mora-
torium and installs the debtor securely in possession 
meanwhile, subject only to payment of certain rent fixed 
by appraisers and applicable first to taxes and then to 
all creditor's pro rata. At the end of the 3-year mora-
torium, or sooner, the debtor may have the property 
regardless and free of liens for its appraised value. 
Johnson, Commentaries, Chandler Act. 11 U. S. C. A. 
(Sec. 201 to end) p. xxv-xxvi. 
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2. HISTORY OF FRAZIER-LEMKE ACT 
We have already set out the subetance of the Frazier-
Lemke Act, Section 75 of the bankruptcy law, 11 U. S. 
C. A., Sec. 203. Now for its history. 
A. LEGISLATIVE 
The Act was depression-born, being first enacted in 
1933. It was declared to be only an emergency measure. 
11 U. S. C. A. 203 (s)-6. It was to have continued for 
five years up to March 3, 1938. l1 U. S. C. A. (Sec. 101 
to end) Sec. 203. (c) p. 975. But ~till depression minded, 
Congress in 1938 extended it two more years to March 4, 
1940. 11 U. S. C. A .. (Section 201 to end) Section 203 
(c) p. 8, and the Act, we are advised, was just recently 
extended again four more years to March 4, 1944. The 
last extension is too recent to afford the writer access 
to its text or reference, and is therefore omitted here; 
but the bill as reported by the House Committee (Febru-
ary 21, 19:40) would grant the farmer heaping measures 
of congressional favor, in addition to extending the Act, 
by offering rewards of two years further moratorium in 
individual cases after the 3-year stay expires, if the 
court. finds he has merited the same. Numerous other 
broad and significant changes are included~ House of 
Representatives Report, February 21, 19:40, No. 1658, 
76th Congress, 3rd Session, Sec. "f" p. 11. 
B. BEFORE THE. CouRTS 
Perhaps no Act of Congress ever received more and 
varied discussion upon its constitutionality than did the 
Frazier-Lemke law. The books abound with the deci-
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sions of the United States courts, both district courts 
and Circuit Courts of Appeal, upholding it on the one 
hand, and on the other condemning it upon considerations 
of constitutional law including due process, equal pro-
tection of the laws, and the power of Congress to estab-
lish uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcy. Only 
confusion was the result. No good purpose would be 
served in a citation of these authorities. They are now 
only history, for the Act has finally reached the Supreme 
Court and received its attention in three cases. which we 
shall now note. 
1. THE_ RADFORD CASE 
The first time the Frazier-Lemke Act was tested by 
the Supreme Court ( 1935) subsection '' s' ', the second 
portion of the Act which provides the 3-year moratorium 
(then 5) was stricken down. Louisville Joint Stock 
Land Bank vs. Radford, 295 U. S. 555. 79 L. Ed. 1593. 
55 S. Ct. 854. 97 A. L. R. 1106. 
The unanimous opinion by Mr. Justice Brandeis held 
the original subsection '' s'' invalid for depriving the 
mortgagee of the right to-
( 1) retain his lien until paid ; 
(2) realize on. the security at a judicial public sale; 
(3) determine when a sale shall be had; 
( 4) bid at the sale and thus protect his interest; 
and, 
(5) control the property during the period of de-
fault (by a receiver, etc.) and thus receive the 
rents; 
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all of which were guaranteed by the applicable Kentucky 
statute regarding mortgages, and that hence the mort-
gagee was deprived of due process and his property 
taken without compensation contrary to the 5th Amend-
ment. 
And so, the original subsection '' s'' was invalidated 
and the moratorium of the Frazier-Lemke Act was tem-
porarily gone. 
2. WRIGHT vs. VINTON BRANCH 
Soon, however, Congress re-enacted subsection '' s '' 
to so pattern it as to avoid the interdiction of the ruling 
in the Radford case, and with but slight changes it soon 
reached the Supreme Court again, this time in 19·37 in 
the Virginia case, Wright vs. Vinton Branch of the Moun .. 
tain Trust Bank of Roanoke, Virginia. 300 U. S. 440. 81 
L. Ed. 736. 57 S. Ct. 556. 112 A. L. R. 1455. 
Again the ruling was unanimous. Again the opinion 
was by Mr. Justice Brandeis, but this time subsection 
'' s '' was upheld as not unconstitutionally infringing up-
on the rights of mortgagees and not violative of the 5th 
Amendment. 
Moreover, in justifying its validity, the court dis-
cussed the Act's provision for closing the proceedings 
at any time when it was apparent the debtor could not 
refinance within three years, saying: 
''(The Act) must be interpreted as meaning 
that the court may terminate the stay if after a 
reasonable time it becomes evident that there is 
no reasonable hope that the debtor can rehabili-
, tate himself within the 3-year period ... And if 
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the debtor is beyond all reasonable hope of finan-
cial rehabilitation, and the proeeeding·s under Sec-
tion 75 cannot be expected to have any effect be-
yond postponing- inevitable liquidation, the pro-
ceedings u-ill be halted at the outset.'' (Paren-
theses and italics added.) 
Thus, althoug-h the Act had been sustained, the rule 
of Wright vs. Vinton Branch had become the law there-
of throughout the land. Federal district courts and 
Circuit Courts of Appeal followed its mandate as final, 
and for failure to show a reasonable hope of rehabilita-
tion, dismissed on every hand proceedings under the Act 
and loosed the creditor to pursue his remedy by action 
to foreclose. 
Our own Circuit Court of Appeals (lOth) became 
committeed to the rule as being the mandate of the Su-
preme Court. Sullivan vs. Tofflemoyer (C. C. A. lOth 
1939) 104 F. (2d) 835. In that case, Judge Bratton cites 
Wright vs. Vinton Branch as binding, and says: 
"But the statute presupposes a reasonable 
probability that the debtor will be able to liqui-
date his debts. Tha.t postulate is implicit in the 
act. A debtor without present or potential equity 
in his property with no reasonable chance of pay-
ing or refunding the liens on his property, and 
who is beyond all reasonable hope of rehabili-
tation, is not entitled to invoke the statute and 
thus merely defer inevitable liquidation. A pro-
, ceeding should be halted when it appears that 
nothing beyond postponement of ineV'itable liqui-
dation can be expected.'' (Italics added.) 
Other Circuit Courts of Appeal fell into line. In re : 
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Borgelt (7th) 79 F. (2d) 929; Massey vs. Farmers, etc. 
Trust Company (4th) 94 F. (2d) 526; Cowherd vs. 
Phoenix etc. Bank (8th) 99 F. (2d) 2·25, certiorari denied 
59 S. Ct. 583 ; Bender vs. Federal Farm Mortgage Cor .. 
poration (8th) 99 F. (2d) 252; Donald vs. San Antonio 
etc. Bank (5th) 100 F. ( 2d) 312 ; Wilson vs. Alliance Life 
Insurance Company (5th) 102 F. (2d) 365. 
But lawyers and others were de:Stined for surprise, 
for the rule was not so firmly rooted by Wright vs. Vin-
ton Branch as they had thought, and as we shall presently 
see. 
3. THE BARTELS CASE 
For nearly three years after Wright vs. Vinton 
B·ranch, supra, the Federal Courts had confidently fol-
lowed its reasonable hope doctrine, which our own lOth 
Circuit Court of Appeals had, as we have seen, deduced 
from that decision to be the ''postulate implicit in the 
Act," and had dismissed for lack of reasonable hope of 
the debtor's rehabilitation. But in December, 1939, due 
to a disagreement among the judges themselves in the 
5th Circuit, the Act was again presented to the Supreme 
Court, and this time the Court overruled Wright vs. Vin-
ton Branch, and all of the deci~sions of the Circuit Courts 
of Appeal and district courts came tumbling down. This 
time the Court repudiated the reasonable hope rule and 
held once a farmer suffers a refusal of his proposal for 
composition and extension (subsections "a" to "r") 
and then "amends" his petition and under ",s" asks and 
is' adjudged to be a bankrupt, he becomes entitled to the 
3-year moratorium as a matter of right and the court 
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cannot dismiss, notwithstanding his utter impoverish-
ment, and no matter that he will never be rehabilitated, 
Wright vs. Vinton Branch to the contrary, notwith-
standing. 
This case is John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance 
Company vs. Bartels (D·ecember 4, 1939) 60 S. Ct. 221. 
Chief Justice Hughes says in the unanimous opinion 
there: 
"The subsections of Section 75 \vhich regulate 
the procedure in relation to the effort of a fanner-
debtor to obtain a composition or extension con-
tain no provision for a dismissal because of the 
absence of a reasonable probability of the finan-
cial rehabilitation of the debtor. 
And that "What is said upon this in Note 6 
in Wright v. Vinton Branch, 300 U. S. 440, 46·2, 
57 S. Ct. 556, 561, 81 L. Ed. 736, 112 A. L. R. 1455, 
was not essential to the opinion in that case and 
is not supported by the terms of the statute.'' 
This is now the law. The implications of the Bartels 
case are definite. The reasonable hope doctrine is gone. 
No matter how much a debtor owes or ho\v great his 
debt exceeds his equity-and oftentimes it is actually 
manyfold, as in the case of second or more remote mort-
gages; no matter that the creditor has the entire invest-
ment and the debtor none whatever left in the property; 
no matter from indifference born of despair, or even 
wilfully, he may have long since ceas-ed to look after 
the property or to cultivate the land, repaint the build-
ing.s and preserve the farm; no matter he has suffered it 
to become increasingly obsolescent; no matter how in-
dulgent a forebearing creditor theretofore may have 
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been-no matter all these, and the debtor with no inter-
est left and the creditor with all that can be said to be 
left in the property at a time when he finally should be 
entitled by State law to take over and attempt to sal-
vage some part of his losses, still the debtor by now 
virtually a stranger to any interest in the property, 
takes over and prevents the creditor, to whom it should 
rightfully belong, from entering and restoring the prop-
erty while dilapidation, depreciation and obsolesence 
continue their merciless toll three years longer; perhaps 
by the new Act for five. But, holds the Supreme Court, 
the mortgagee is not deprived of due process. 
The creditor himself may, by the very operation of 
the Act, also be rendered impoverished and his resources 
along with what is left with the debtor's wiped out. 
The creditor will sometimes be an individual, other times, 
a life insurance company guardian of the savings: of 
millions of small policyholders, including farmers, or it 
may even be a trust or foundation for the maintaining 
of a unive:vsity, hospital or other charity. But it also is 
subject if the debtor avails himself of the stay. 
The Act applies not only in the case of mortgages·, 
but also to equities of every sort, including contracts 
for purchase, conditional sales, and even the right of 
redemption on foreclosure although the statutory period 
has expired, i£ the sheriff's deed has not yet been issued. 
Subsection "n." 
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3. FURTHER STATEMENT 
We have discussed the Frazier-Lemke Act at length 
so the court may have before. it the benefit of its origin 
and history and its present status and effect in approach-
ing this appeal. 
We have seen that the Supreme Court first de-
nounced, but later sustained, the Act, establishing for ~ 
time the reasonable hope rule, but totally capitulated 
to its appeal finally in December, 1939, and that now, 
once a debtor is adjudicated under '' s, '' no creditor may 
pry him away from the refuge of its 3-year moratorium 
{now possibly 5) for all his utter impoverishment and 
stark inability to rehabilitate. 
The administrator here asks leave of the probate 
court to seek the benefits of Section 75 in the bankruptcy 
court. His wife, Anna L. Harris, had commenced such 
a proceeding and it was pending in the federal court as 
early as February, 1938. But she died within a year, 
whereupon, in January, 1939, the proceed.ings were 
abated by order of that court. (Abs. 3, Tr. 34.) 
Two months later, March 22, 1939, the probate court 
appointed respondent as her administrator herein. (Abs. 
3, Tr. 34.) But conceding appellant bank, then simply 
a mortgage holder, the right to be heard, the court simul-
taneously ordered notice to the bank in the event the 
administrator should ask for authority to seek a revivor 
of the abated bankruptcy proceedings. (Abs. 1-2, Tr. 30.) 
The bank then proceeded to foreclose. Judgment 
of foreclosure was entered July 17, 19·39. A sheriff's sale 
was had and the certificate of sale issued to the bank 
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August 15, 1939, for $5417.46, and the bank was awaiting 
the sheriff's deed which was to be· due on February 15, 
1940. ( Abs. 3-4, Tr. 34.) 
But five days (February 10) before the redemption 
period was up and the sheriff's deed was due, the admin-
istrator petitioned the probate court for leave to apply 
in the federal court for a revivor of thH bankruptcy 
proceedings. (Abs. 2, Tr. 31.) This petition was heard 
on that day, was taken under advisement, and was 
granted by an order of February 13. The order, however, 
provides that it may be stayed pending appeal by the 
bank's giving supersedeas bond which it did immediately 
the same day. (Abs. 3-4, Tr. 34.) (Tr. 38). 
It is from this order that the bank appeals, assign-
ing error in the granting of the petition and entry of the 
~rder, (Ahs. 5), the administrator lacking authority, and 
the probate court likewise being powerless under the 
probate code to permit him, to subject the estate to the 
processes of the Frazier-Lemke Act as we shall no'Y' see. 
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4. THE AD!MINISTRATOR AND THE PROBATE 
COURT .A.RE POWERLESS UNDER THE PROBATE 
CODE TO SUBMIT THE ESTATE TO THE 
BANJ(RUPTCY COURT 
The administrator applied, as we have seen, to the 
probate court for authority to g-o to the federal court. 
This he did, because such application is a pre-requisite 
under the Frazier-Lemke Act. 
True it is that subsection '' r'' includes the admin-
istrator of a deceased farmer within its definition of the 
term ''fanner. '' 
'' ( r) For the purposes of this section . . . 
the term 'farmer' ... includes the personal repre-
sentative of a deceased farmer.'' 
But consistent with orderly procedure and cog-
nizant of the jurisdiction of a probate court over its 
own administrator and pursuant to its rule making pow-
ers bestowed by Section 30 of the Bankruptcy Act (11 
U. S. C. A., Sec. 53), the Supreme Court on January 16, 
1939, promulgated its General Order 50(9) requiring an 
administrator who would seek the benefit of the Frazier-
Lemke Act to first obtain the authority of the probate 
court which created him and to exhibit in his petition 
to the federal court his appointment and authorization, 
thus: 
"(9) The personal representative of a de-
ceased farmer who desires in his representative 
capacity to effect, under section 75, a composition 
or extension of the debts of the estate, shall attach 
. to his petition, in lieu of schedules, the following 
. papers, certified as correct by the court which 
appointed him (hereinafter referred to as the 
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probate court): (a) a copy of the order of his 
appointment, (b) a copy of an order of the pro-
bate court authorizing him to file the petition," 
... etc. General Order 50(9). 11 U. S. C. A. (Sec. 
53-100), 19·39 Pocket Part, p. 38. 
Now the source of an administrator's existence and 
power, and that of his creator the probate court as well, 
is exclusively the statute, viz, the Probate Code. 
Probate proceeding.s are statutory. 
''Proceedings for the administration of es-
tates of decedents are purely statutory. In fact, 
the whole matter of the disposition of estates of 
decedents is within the legislative control." (Ital-
ics added) 1 Bancroft's Probate Practice 76. 
The probate court's jurisdiction is exclusive. 
''Jurisdiction of the pro bate courts to ad-
minister upon the estate of decedents is prhnary 
and exclusive. It w1ould be an anomaly i.n· juris-
prudence if a court vested with full jurisdiction 
in ma.tters of probate could be controlled in the 
exercise of that jurisdiction by a co-10'rdinate court 
or even by the samB court sitting as a court of 
general jurisdio,tion." 1 Bancroft's Probate Prac-
tice 62. (Italics added.) 
And since probate proceedings are exclusively statu-
tory, a statutory grant of specific powers constitutes by 
implication a limitation on those powers of the probate 
court. 
''Since probate pr~ceedings are everywhere 
recognized as being statutory in their nature, the 
effect of a specific enumeration of powers of a 
court exercising probate jurisdiction is to limit 
such powers by implication to those expressly 
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conferred.'' (Italics added.) 1 Bancroft's Pro-
bate Practice 39. '' 
In fact this court has already recognized probate 
proceeding·s to be strictly statutory. In re: Cloward's 
Estate. ---- U. ----· 82 P. (2d) 336. There, this court said 
upon the subject: 
''The law governing wills and the administra-
tion of estates of deceased persons is stat·utory. 
The court, sitting in probate, derives its power 
franz the statutes and has only such pow·ers as are 
granted by statu.te or reasonably implied or rea-
sonably necessary and proper to effectuate the 
powers which are given." (Italics added.) 
Thus an administrator, even the probate court itself 
his creator, has those and only those powers which the 
statute provides or which are reasonably necessary to 
effect those granted. He has no further powers. 
Since the administrator possesses only those pow-
ers which the statute bestows, it is clear he cannot sub-
ject the estate to the jurisdiction of another forum unless 
the statute says so. And since the powers of the pro-
bate court are likewise limited it, too, is helpless to au-
thorize the administrator to do so unless the statute 
permits. 
It results, then, that without a grant, explicit or 
implied in the Probate Code, the administrator may not 
transfer, and the probate court is powerless to surrender, 
the administration of a deceased's affairs to a bank-
ruptcy court. 
It is of no consequence that Section 75 includes the 
farmer's administrator and that the General Order per-
mits him to apply for bankruptcy if the probate court 
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consents, for probate proceedings exist, as we have seen, 
solely by virtue of State sta~ute, and the agencies em-
ployed by the statute in effecting administration and 
disposition of estates are its creatures, the administra-
tor and the probate court, both controlled exclusively 
by the limitations it provides. 
Clearly subsection "r" and General Order 50(9) 
were not designed to invade a State Probate Code. Such 
an attempt would have been idle for State probate stat-
utes are the source and limit of all probate proceedings 
and a federal court, being a court of limited, and not 
general jurisdiction, has no jurisdiction of probate pro-
ceeding.s. 
"A proceedings for the probate of a will is 
not a suit of a civil nature at law or in equity 
within the jurisdiction vested by the Judiciary 
Acts upon the federal courts, and they .have no 
jurisdiction over such proceedings and of distri-
bution of estates because (1) the subject is statu--
tory, and (2) they are in the nature of proceed-
ings in rem, and proceedings in rem are not a 
part of general equity jurisdiction of any court. 
''The federal courts cannot distribute gen-
erally because the state courts must first establish 
the succession. In truth they have no probate 
pow·ers or authority." (Italics added.) 2· Hughes 
Federal Practice 216, 217. 
The inclusion of the administrator within the tenn 
"farmer" and the General Order requiring him to ob-
tain the probate court's authority are simply gestures 
which beckon him to the bankruptcy court, no more. But 
before he may accept their invitation he must have the 
consent of the ·probate court, and both he and that court 
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must be authorized by the statute. 
Does the Probate Code of Utah contain such author-
ity! Obviously not. 
The Utah Probate Code was enacted long prior to 
the Frazier-Lemke Act and before the latter was ever 
conceived. Our own legislature, not to mention Congress 
itself, had never heard of it and therefore in enacting 
our Probate Code the legislature could by no power of 
divination have contemplated it. Consequently, the Pro-
bate Code nowhere mentions the Frazier-Lemke Act, 
Section 75, nor the subject of bankruptcy at all. Since 
it is nowhere mentioned it follows that nowhere is it pro-
vided therein that an administrator may resort to Sec-
tion 75. The express provisions of the Code are exclu-
sively in regard to the administration of a decedent's 
property· in a. probate court and its distribution to the 
heirs according to its proper devolution. 
Distribution with dispatch is the Code's theme 
throughout. The representative must "immediately" 
give notice to creditors. Revised Statutes 1933, 102-9-1. 
He must file an inventory and appraisement in three 
months, 102-7-1; is required to account in 30 days after 
notice to creditors and also six months after his appoint-
ment, 102-11-32; pay for the funeral and last sickness 
as soon as he is in funds, 102-9-21, and may be required 
to distribute the property when the time for presenting 
of claims has expired, 102-12-4. 
To the end that administration be closed without 
delay, creditors must present claims in at least four 
months or they are barred forever, 102-9-4, and must 
sue on their rejected claims within three months, 102-9-9. 
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(Yet under the Frazier-Lemke Act, however, they cannot 
maintain any suit at all against the farmer, so while the 
three years' moratorium slowly runs, the three months' 
limitation against the creditors is quickly over. In fact, 
subsection '' o '' enjoins all ''proceedings'' against the 
f~irmer in any court. Thus, query if the creditor may 
even present his claim after the administrator gets into 
the federal court.) 
The spirit of the Probate Code is administration 
and final distribution for the sake of heirs and creditors 
with dispatch. That of Section 75 is altogether contrary, 
being delay and eventual avoidance of any distribution. 
This court has held that the administrator and the 
probate court are endowed with only those implied pow-
ers reasonably necessary to effect the powers expressed. 
In re: Cloward, supra. And since nowhere in the Code 
is there any power expressed which authorizes an ad-
ministrator to resort to the Frazier-Leffike Act or per-
mits the probate court to authorize him to do so; and, 
since the only implied' powers are those incident to the 
administration and distribution of estates in the: probate 
court and not in a federal court or court of bankruptcy, 
(neither of w~ich has jurisdiction in pro bate), it results 
that neither the administrator nor the probate court 
has any power express or imp,lied to carry the estate and 
its administration over into the federal court and thus 
abandon it and the jurisdiction of the probate court to a 
court of bankruptcy from which it may not be reclaimed. 
The court therefore erred in entering its order au-
thorizing the administrator to do so herein and the same 
must be reversed. 
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5. THE ADMINISTRATOR AND rrHE PROBATE 
COURT ... \RE POWERLESS TO SUBMIT THE REAL 
PROPERTY OF THE ESTAT·E TO THE 
BANKRUPTCY COURT 
But in any event the administrator may not submit 
the real property of an estate to a proceedings under 
the Frazier-Lemke Act. It has been so held where the 
question has arisen. We have found only two instances 
where the question was decided. Both times it was 
against the administrator. 
The case of in re: Reynolds, 21 F. Supp. 369, involved 
the Probate Code of Oklahoma and was decided by a 
federal district court ther.e in 19'37. The facts are strik-
ingly similar to those at bar. Three months after filing 
his petition under Section 75 (here 1 year) the debtor 
died and the proceedings were dismissed. 
One month later (here, two) the administrator was 
appointed. 
Eleven months thereafter (same as here) the ad-
ministrator petitioned the federal court to revive the 
proceedings and was met with a motion to dismiss the 
entire cause on the grounds that title· to the real property 
vested immediately in the heirs under the Oklahoma law. 
The section in question ( 0. S. 1931, Sec. 1615) identical 
with our own Section 101-4-2 is as follows: 
''The property, both real and personal, of 
one who dies without disposing of it by will passes 
to the heirs of the intestate, subject to the control 
of the court, and to the possession of any admin-
istrator appointed by the court for the purposes 
of administration.'' 
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The federal court, bound as it was thereby, looked 
to the state court decisions on the subject of descent 
and said that the Oklahoma Supreme Court had com-
mented on this section several times and quoted from the 
state court in Seal vs. Banes, 168 Okl. 550; 35 P. (2d) 
704: 
"Upon a person dying intestate, the heirs 
of such person become immediately vested with 
the estate, and the estate is indefeasible, subject 
to the control of the county court and the posses-
sion of the management by the administrator, 
and it is his duty simply to preserve the estate 
until distribution to the heirs, unless, and in the 
manner provided by statute, the necessity iShould 
arise for a sale." 
The court also quotes from another state court 
decision, in re: Hibdons Estate, 102 Okl. 145; 228 P. 154: 
"Under section 11300, C. L. 1921, all proper-
ty, both real and personal, of all persons who die 
intestate· passes to the heirs of such intestate, 
subject to the control of the county court and 
subject to administration.'' 
The court continues saying: 
''The question of whether or not an admin-
istrator can maintain an action in bankruptcy 
under Section 75 of the Bankruptcy Act has not 
been passed upon by the higher courts, but in an 
opinion involving the same substantial provisions 
of the statute of Illinois as are contained in the 
Oklahoma statutes, with reference to the powers 
of executors and administrators, the district court 
for the Eastern district of Illinois, in the case of 
in re: Buxton, 14 F. Supp. 616 has held, quoting 
from the sixth syllabus: Deceased farmer's ad-
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ministrator, appointed under Illinois law, could 
not be adjudicated a bankrupt under statute, not-
withstanding· statute includes personal repre>sent-
ative of deceased farmer within designation of 
'farmer' in view of limited authority of admin-
istrator over decedent's real estate under Illinois 
law and his consequent inability to subject de-
cedent's real estate to provisions of statute. (11 
U. S. C. A. 203 "r"). 
''The Illinois statute is so similar to the Okla-
homa statute that the court cann'ot conceive of a 
different conclusion under the circumstances of 
this case than that reached by Judge Wham in 
the Illinois case. It is the judgment of the court 
that the administrator cannot maintain this ac-
tion. '' In re: Reynolds, 21 F. Supp. 369 (D. C. 
Okl.) 
Thus, under statutory provisions identical with those 
of our own Probate Code regarding descents of real 
property the court held the administrator was without 
authority to maintain the Frazier-Lemke proceedings 
and they were dismissed. 
The Illinois federal case, Buxton's Estate, 14 F. 
Supp. 616, involved a petition to the federal court under 
Section 75 made in the first instance by the adminis-
trator and "amended" later in an attempt to bring 
him within subsection "s ". 
The creditors moved a dismissal. The grounds of 
the motion were that under the Illinois Probate Code 
administrators are ''without power to enter into bank-
ruptcy under Section 75, even though that section has 
opened the doors to representatives of deceased 
persons." 
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The court asks : 
''May an administrator of a deceased farmer 
appointed under the laws of Illinois be lawfully 
adjudicated a bankrupt under said subsection (s) 
in view of the fact that said subsection opens the 
door of bankruptcy thereunder to 'any farmer' 
and that subsection ( r) of said Section 75 . . . 
includes the personal representative of a deceased 
farmer''~ In re : Buxton, supra. 
It answers thus: 
''My conclusion is that while the term 'per-
sonal representative' as used in subs.ection (r) of 
Section 75 may be broad enough to include all 
executor.s and administrators of the estates of 
deceased farmers, it does not follow that all exe-
cutors and administrators may lawfully enter into 
bankruptcy.'' in re: Buxton, supra. 
And the court continue;s : 
''It was. not the purpose of Congress through 
this legislation to attempt to add to or remove 
limits from the power and authority conferred by 
a state statute upon a personal representative 
cr~ated solely by virtue of such statute through 
an order of court authorized thereon as is an 
admini~trator of an estate of a deceased person 
under the laws of Illinois. Rather it would seem 
that the sole purpose of Congress was to make 
Sections 7 4 and 75 of the Bankruptcy Act avail-
able to the personal representatives of deceased 
farmers, who . by statute, will or other creating 
means are given sufficiently broad powers to 
tak~ advantage, depending on the extent of such 
power' of all or' any part of the provisions of said 
sections.'' In re : Buxton, supra. 
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As to the administrator's power under the Illinois 
law it is said: 
'' .... \.n administrator of an estate of a deceased 
person in Illinois is appointed under statutes 
giving him strictly limited power. Being a crea-
ture of statute, he must derive his entire authority 
thereunder. 
''An administrator takes no title to real es-
tate, either legal or equitable, but it descends to 
and vests in the heirs at once upon the death of 
the ancestor.'' In re : Buxton, supra. 
Then coming to the administrator and the Frazier-
Lemke Act, the court concludes : 
''Accepting the foregoing as an accurate 
statement of the very lin1ited powers of an ad-
ministrator under the laws of Illinois, it is diffi-
cult to see how he could, within the limitations of 
those powers, lawfully take advantage of said sub-
section ( s) insofar as it applies to real estate. 
For him to do so would require him to take and 
for a period of three years retain possession of 
the real estate which on the death of his decedent 
vested in the heirs at law.'' In re: Buxton, supra. 
The Illinois federal court then finally concluded that 
the administrator with his limited power and authority 
,_ over the real estate cannot subject it to the provisions 
of Section 75 and granted the motion to dismiss. 
And so by the only decisions available to our knowl-
edge, it is unanimously considered that the administra-
tor is without power to subject the real property of an 
estate to Section 75 and the order herein must be 
reversed. 
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6. THE ADMINISTRATOR'S PETITION FAILS TO 
STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION 
· Aside from the question of the power of the. admin-
istrator and probate court under our Code to subject the 
property, particularly real estate as here, to the bank-
ruptcy court which is clearly lacking, the administrator's 
petition was wholly insufficient. (Abs. 2, Tr. 31.) The 
petition follows: PETITION 
''Comes now Sterling P. Harris, administra-
tor of the above entitled estate, and respectfully 
shows to the court : 
''That at the time of the death of Anna L. 
Harris, there was pending in the United States 
District Court for the District of Utah, a pro-
ceeding under Section 75 of the Bankruptcy Act; 
that said proceeding was abated by the death of 
said Anna L. Harris. 
"Your petitioner further shows to the court 
that unless said proceeding is revived and rein-
stated, the entir~ estate of the said deceased is in 
danger of being lost. 
''WHERIEFORE, said petitioner prays for an 
order of this court authorizing him to apply to the 
United States District Court for an order reviv-
ing and reinstating the said debtor relief pro-
ceeding.'' 
As ·the reader will see, the petition wholly ·fails to 
state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. Only 
two facts, no more, are stated. These are simply: 
(1) That when Mrs. Harris died the Frazier-
Lemke proceedings were pending in the federal 
court; and, 
(2) that they were then abated. 
The only remaining allegation is not one of fact 
but is purely a oon.clusion : 
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''That unless said proceedings are revived 
and reinstated, the entire estate of the said de-
ceased is in danger of being lost.'' 
The p·etition is barren of any facts showing a rea-
son for the court to g·rant it. No explanation of how the 
estate, the heirs and creditors and others concerned 
would benefit by the bankruptcy proceedings being re-
vived was made therein. No facts were exhibited to 
show the bankruptcy court could or would better admin-
ister the estate th~n the probate court and that there-
fore the latter should abdicate and should surrender 
its jurisdiction to the federal court, or explaining in any 
way why the probate court should abandon its solemn 
duty and jurisdiction specially enjoined upon it by statute 
to administer to a conclusion the estate in its own court 
to the exclusion of all others. 
Probate courts are quite competent to administer 
the affairs of deceased debtors. In fact, they them-
selves have authority to authorize compositions. by ad-
ministrators of debtors, which the administrator must 
admit, would have to be the first objective he would seek 
in the bankruptcy court under the first part of Section 
75, "a" to "r". 
The Probate Code specifically authorizes composi-
tions for harrassed debtors. It reads: 
"102-11-12. Whenever a debtor of the de-
cedent is unable to pay all his debts, the execu-
tor or administrator, with the approval of the 
court or judge, may compound with hin1 and give 
a discharge upon receiving a fair and just divi-
dend of his effects. A compromise may also be 
authorized when it appears to be just and for the 
best interests of the estate.'' 
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The petition does not state that the administrator 
is unable to effect a composition or extension in the pro-
bate court where he belongs, or that he will be able to 
effect one at all in the bankruptcy court; or that if he 
could do so in the state court, that he could do better in 
the federal court. For all that appears he could have 
obtained a composition in the probate court as effectively 
and advantageously as any he could hope for in the fed-
eral court. 
Nor is his conclusion ''that the estate is in danger 
of being lost'' of any aid in his attempting to state a 
cause of action for-
'' conclusions of law are not to be considered in 
determining whether a pleading states a cause of 
action." Gunnison Irr. Co. vs. Peterson 74 U. 
460. 280 P. 715. And see to same effect 1 Ban-
croft's Code Pl. 90. Id. 10 Yr. Supp. 26. 
And 1ince the petition does not state a cause of 
action it can be challenged at any time and place, even 
on appeal, and the failure to demur is inconsequential. 
1 Bancroft's Code Pl. 157. Id. 10 Yr. Supp. 396. 49 C. J. 
820. Id. 839. For example, it is said: 
"1216. An objection that the declaration, 
petition, or complaint does not state facts suf-
ficient to constitute a cause of action may be 
raised at any time, and at any stage of the pro-
ceedings; it may be raised after answer, after the 
time to demur or answer has passed, at the trial, 
before verdict or judgment, after judgment, or 
even for the first time on appeal.'' 49 C. J. 820. 
Since the petition failed to ·state a cause of action, 
the court erred in entering its order thereon and the 
same must be reversed. 
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7. THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN 
GRANTING THE ADMINISTRATOR'S 
PETITION 
We have seen that under the Probate Code from 
which they derive their powers the administrator and 
the probate court are powerless to enter into bankruptcy 
and that regardless of their lack of power the petition 
failed to state a cause of action. 
But had they such power and had the petition been 
sufficient, granting the administrator the authority he 
sought would not be a matter of right but would involve 
the exercise of the sound discretion of the court. 
Certainly the court in such cases would have the duty 
to apprais-e the situation and determine two things: 
(1) Whether any benefit was likely to result to the 
estate, the heirs and creditors by its allowance, and, if so, 
(2) whether such benefits were calculated to exceed those 
available in the probate court. If no benefit were to 
accrue, obviously the petition should be denied. And 
although certain benefits may appear likely, still the 
court should not grant the petition unless the benefits 
are fairly calculated to exceed those available in the 
probate court. For certainly there would be no proper 
reason in a probate court's resigning in favor of another 
unless it were assured such other would do a better job 
than it. No such assurance was made to appear by this 
petition. 
Now the deceased had journeyed in the bankruptcy 
court for one year without any benefit before she died. 
Her administrator also had had charge of the estate with-
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in the probate court for another year thereafter. Alto-
gether they had spent two year.s in the two courts before 
the petition was filed herein. Both had been unable to pay 
the debts of the estate. Though both courts had power 
to authorize a composition with creditors, they had failed 
to obtain one in either. 
After two years of inaction and only five days 
before· ~sheriff's ·deed, the administrator set out to effect 
a composition. He offered no excuse for this· previous 
inaction. Neither did he suggest how a composition 
might be accomplished. Not even did he say it would be 
possible. Although, if it could be arranged, the probate 
court had power to approve it, he avoided that court in 
this regard. The reason is obvious. He did not seek a 
composition at all. What he sought was delay. More 
delay besides the two years already spent. He wanted 
three more years, which would make five in all (perhaps 
now seven) to use and withhold the property from the 
heirs and from the creditor who had invested the sav-
ings of its depositors in this farm, and to whom it right-
fully should belong. No solution was offered. Nothing 
but delay and more delay would be the result. The sit-
uation was hopeless. But notwithstanding, the lower 
court granted the petition. In view of all of the circum-
stances -it, in so doing, did not exercise a sound discre-
tion, but its discretion was abused, and its order there-
fore was erroneous and should be reversed. 
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8. CONCLUSION 
Whether an administrator should be empowered to 
resort to bankruptcy is a question exclusively for the 
legislature of this State. To date it has not ordained that 
he may, although it has already met and adjourned four 
times 'vhile the Act has been in force. Each time it has 
failed to give its authority. Until it does, no court may 
assume to do so for it. 
It is submitted by appellant: 
1. That the authority of the administrator and the 
probate court are limited by the Probate Code to the 
powers therein contained and the right to enter into 
bankruptcy is not conferred and the administrator and 
court are therefore powerless to do so. 
2. That since the real property of an intestate in-
stantly devolves upon his heirs, the administrator's 
limited powers thereover are not sufficient to allow him 
to resort to the Frazier-Lemke Act and deprive the 
heirs and creditors of an administration and distribu-
tion by a probate court for 3 years-now perhaps 5. 
3. That the administrator's petition fails to state 
facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. 
4. That regardless of the foregoing, the trial court 
abused its discretion in granting the petition, the de ... 
ceased and administrator having already spent 2 years 
in the bankruptcy and probate courts without avail, the 
latter now seeking a further moratorium of 3 more, 
aggregating 5 years in all, with the possibility of extend-
ing it another 2 years for a total of 7 if the bill as re-
ported by the House Committee becomes law. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
30 
5. The order authorizing the administrator to apply 
to the United States Court is erroneous, and the trial 
court· exceeded its powers thereby and the· same should 
be reversed and set aside with costs to appellant. 
March 23, 1940 
Respectfully, 
T'HOMAS & THOMAS, 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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